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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to show that allowing for taste heterogeneity does not
address the similarity critique of discrete-choice models. Although IIA may techni-
cally be broken in aggregate, the mixed logit model allows neither a given individual
nor the population as a whole to behave with perfect substitution when facing perfect
substitutes. Thus, the mixed logit model implies that individuals behave inconsis-
tently across choice sets.
Estimating the mixed logit on data in which individuals do behave consistently
can result in biased parameter estimates, with the individuals’ tastes for desirable
attributes being systemically undervalued.
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1 The authors would like to thank David E. Bell and Sunil Gupta for comments
and suggestions that have greatly improved the paper. The authors alone, of course,
are responsible for remaining errors.
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It is widely believed that choice models that allow for taste heterogeneity over-
come the issues created by the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
property. It has been argued that allowing for di erences in tastes across in-
dividuals creates correlations in the random component of utility that “break”
the undesirable IIA property and allow any substitution pattern to be found.
Thus, the problems with IIA are thought to be solved by models such as the
mixed logit [cf. Allenby and Lenk, 1994, Brownstone and Train, 1998, Rev-
elt and Train, 1998, McFadden and Train, 2000, Glasgow, 2001, Chintagunta
et al., 2003, Erdem et al., 2008].
This belief raises some conceptually troubling questions: if a model implies that
individuals make inconsistent choices across di erent presentations of a choice
set when their tastes are assumed to be the same, why would the same model
predict that individuals behave consistently when their tastes are assumed to
be di erent? On the other hand, if the substitution patterns are ﬁxed only in
the population, should we not be concerned that this is another example of the
ecological fallacy [Robinson, 1950] or Simpson’s paradox [Simpson, 1951]? 2
Even if the model does allow more ﬂexible substitution to be found, how do
we explain why allowing for di erences in tastes solves the problem?
It seems to have been lost in the current literature that the critiques of Debreu
[1960], Savage [Luce and Suppes, 1965] and McFadden [1974], among others,
suggest more than that IIA is an undesirable property. These critiques also
suggest the type of behavior that is needed to ensure that individuals behave
consistently across choice sets, speciﬁcally that they behave with perfect sub-
stitution 3 when facing perfect substitutes. It has not been shown that models
such as the mixed logit allow this to occur.
The purpose of this paper is to show that allowing for taste heterogeneity
does not address the similarity critique of discrete-choice models, either at the
individual or at the aggregate level of a model. IIA may not technically hold
for the population if tastes vary across individuals, but the mixed logit model
allows neither a given individual nor the population as a whole to behave with
perfect substitution when facing perfect substitutes. Thus, the mixed logit
implies that individuals behave inconsistently across di erent presentations
of the same choice set. Furthermore, estimating the mixed logit on data in
2 The ecological fallacy and Simpson’s paradox both describe situations in which an
incorrect conclusion about individual behavior is reached by observing population
behavior.
3 We use the term perfect substitution to describe the rational choice behavior sug-
gested in each of the similarity critiques. This will be discussed in greater detail in
Section 2.
2which individuals do behave consistently can result in biased parameter esti-
mates, with the individuals’ tastes for desirable attributes being systemically
undervalued.
2 The Similarity Critique
2.1 Individual Choice Behavior
Let us recall the similarity critique by considering an example proposed by
Steenburgh [2008]. Suppose an individual faces a choice between two laptop
computers:
Weight Processor Speed
Laptop A 3 lbs. 2.0 GHz
Laptop B 6 lbs. 3.0 GHz
Laptop A is the lighter alternative, but it runs at a slower speed; Laptop B is
faster, but heavier. The laptops are identical in all other ways. The individual
is indi erent between the two laptop computers and would choose either with
probability 1/2.
Now suppose a third alternative, Laptop B , is added to the choice set. Laptop
B  is identical to Laptop B; it weighs 6 lbs and runs at 3.0 GHz. Thus, the
individual would be equally likely to choose either Laptop B or Laptop B  if she
were asked to choose between just the two of them. What would happen if the
individual were asked to choose among all three alternatives? If the individual
were to behave consistently across the two choice sets, Laptop A would be
chosen with probability 1/2, Laptop B with probability 1/4, and Laptop B 
with probability 1/4. This is the desirable, rational behavior that we refer to
as perfect substitution.
But a model with IIA precludes this from happening because it requires the
ratio of any two choice probabilities to remain the same no matter what other
alternatives are included in the choice set. According to a model with IIA,
the individual would choose Laptop A with probability 1/3, Laptop B with
probability 1/3, and Laptop B  with probability 1/3. The individual does not
behave consistently across the two choice sets because the probability that a
faster laptop is chosen rises from 1/2 in the original set to 2/3 in the set with
a perfect substitute and the probability that the lighter laptop is chosen falls
3from 1/2 to 1/3. Thus, the individual behaves irrationally. 4
While it is commonly understood that IIA is an undesirable property because
it results in irrational choice behavior, it seems to be overlooked that simply
breaking IIA is not su cient to ensure that individuals behave consistently.
To clarify this idea, suppose a third model implies that Laptop A would be
chosen with probability 1/5, Laptop B with probability 2/5, and Laptop B 
with probability 2/5 when Laptop B  is added to the choice set. This new
model clearly breaks IIA. At the same time, it is even more objectionable
than the one with IIA because the probability that a faster laptop is chosen
rises from 1/2 in the original set to 4/5 when the perfect substitute is added
and the probability that the lighter laptop is chosen falls from 1/2 to 1/5. These
represent even greater changes in probability.
A good choice model should allow rational choice behavior to occur, not simply
break IIA. This means that individuals need to be able to behave with perfect
substitution when facing perfect substitutes.
2.2 The Similarity Critique and Population Choice Behavior
It has been shown that IIA does not hold for the population if individuals have
heterogeneous tastes; thus, it has been supposed that IIA is not a concern as
long as a researcher’s interest centers around only the population’s choice
behavior. By extending the previous example, we will show that while taste
heterogeneity may break IIA at the population level of a model, it does not
truly address the similarity critique. 5
Consider the following example. Suppose there are two types of individuals in
the population, Salespeople and Scientists, and the proportion of individuals in
the population of each type is 1/2. Both Salespeople and Scientists prefer laptop
computers that weigh less and that run faster. Nevertheless, Salespeople value
lighter weights more than Scientists do, and Scientists value faster processor
speeds more than Salespeople do. Suppose that when presented with a choice
4 Rational choice behavior, a cornerstone of micro-economic theory, requires an
individual to be able to rank all of the alternatives in order of preference and an
individual’s preferences to be consistent. Thus, an individual cannot be indi erent
between A and B in one choice set, yet prefer B to A in another. Obviously, by
slightly modifying the example it can be shown that the logit model implies strict
preference reversals [Debreu, 1960].
5 Even if allowing for taste variation did address the similarity critique for the pop-
ulation, it would be somewhat troubling to rely on a paradox to do so [Steenburgh,
2008], especially in micro-targeting applications in which individual choice behavior
must be understood.
4between Laptops A and B, a Salesperson chooses Laptop A with probability
2/3 whereas a Scientist chooses Laptop A with probability 1/3.
The market share of each laptop computer is a property of the population.
It can be thought of as the probability that an individual chosen at ran-
dom from the population chooses a given laptop computer. Thus, the mar-
ket share of Laptop A is Pr{A} = Pr{A|Saleperson}Pr{Saleperson} +
Pr{A|Scientist}Pr{Scientist}. Taken together, these assumptions imply the
following choice probabilities:
Salespeople Scientists Population
Laptop A 2/3 1/3 1/2
Laptop B 1/3 2/3 1/2
Again suppose a third alternative identical to Laptop B, weighing 3.0 lbs and
running at 2.0 GHz, is added to the choice set. If the individuals were to behave
with perfect substitution, the following choice probabilities and market shares
would occur:
Salespeople Scientists Population
Laptop A 2/3 1/3 1/2
Laptop B 1/6 1/3 1/4
Laptop B  1/6 1/3 1/4
Yet, if both Salespeople and Scientists were to behave with IIA, the following
choice probabilities and market shares would arise:
Salespeople Scientists Population
Laptop A 1/2 1/5 14/40
Laptop B 1/4 2/5 13/40
Laptop B  1/4 2/5 13/40
Strictly speaking, it should be clear that the market shares do not possess
IIA. If they did, the new market shares would be exactly 1/3 for Laptop A,
1/3 for Laptop B, and 1/3 for Laptop B , as they were for the individual in
the previous example. Nevertheless, it should also be clear that allowing for
di erences in tastes does not address the similarity critique in aggregate. The
population does not behave consistently across the two choice sets because the
market share of the faster laptop increases from from 1/2 in the original set to
14/20 (or 65%) in the set with a perfect substitute and the share of the lighter
5laptop falls from 1/2 to 14/40 (or 35%). 6 Thus, the similarity critique has not
truly been addressed.
The following proposition asserts that this is true in general.
Proposition 1 If individuals behave with IIA, overall demand for a given
alternative must increase if a perfect substitute for it is added to the choice
set. This occurs for every individual in the population, and therefore occurs
for the population as a whole, regardless of whether individuals’ tastes are
di erent.
PROOF. It su ces to consider a choice between two alternatives. Suppose
individual n chooses one alternative with probability Pn and a composite of
other alternatives with probability (1   Pn). Make no assumptions about the
individuals’ tastes, so the Pn can vary across individuals.
Suppose a perfect substitute for the ﬁrst alternative is added to the choice
set. Since individuals behave with IIA, the new choice probabilities satisfy
knPn + knPn + kn (1   Pn)=1 , which implies kn = 1/(1+Pn).
An individual is more likely to pick the alternative with a perfect substitute
in the expanded choice set if 2knPn >P n. This occurs if Pn < 1, which is
obviously true.
Since every individual is more likely to choose the alternative with a perfect







3 Population Correlations and Individual Choice Behavior
In this section, we will derive the mixed logit from the standard random-
coe cients perspective, will discuss the assumptions that are made at the
individual and population levels of the model, and will draw a parallel with
the earlier work of Robinson [1950].
6 In fact, the population’s behavior is much closer to IIA than it is to perfect
substitution.
7 The authors thank David E. Bell for suggesting a greatly reﬁned proof.
63.1 Individual Choice Behavior
Let us begin with the standard theory of how individuals choose among dis-
crete alternatives. Suppose an individual faces a choice among J alternatives.
The utility obtained by individual n from alternative j on a given occasion is
unj = x
 
j n +  nj
 nj
iid   EV (I) for j =1 ,...,J
(1)
The individual’s utility is separated into two components. The ﬁrst compo-
nent, xj n, is referred to as the observed utility. It is a function of the ob-
served attributes of each alternative, xjt, and the individual’s tastes for those
attributes,  n. The second component,  nj, is referred to as the unobserved
utility. It is a random variable that accounts for factors other than the alter-
native’s attributes that a ect the individual’s utility.
The unobserved utilities are commonly assumed to be independent and iden-
tically distributed across alternatives according to a type-I extreme value dis-
tribution. Thus, they are uncorrelated at the individual level of the model.
Cov ( nj, nk) = 0  j  = k (2)
The link between the individual’s utility and observed choice behavior is es-
tablished as follows. Suppose the individual chooses the alternative that pro-
vides the greatest utility. The decision rule governing his or her behavior is to
choose alternative j if and only if uj >u k  k  = j. Given the assumptions of
the model, the probability that individual n chooses alternative j conditional
on his or her tastes is







Thus, the basic model implies that individuals behave with IIA.
3.2 Population Choice Behavior
The theory of individual choice is extended to the population by adding an
additional level to the model. In the mixed logit, the utilities of all individuals
7in the population are jointly modeled as
unj = xj n +  nj
 nj
iid   EV (I) for n =1 ,...N and j =1 ,...,J
 n
iid   MV N ( , ) for n =1 ,...N
(4)
The unobserved utilities for any individual are assumed to be independent
across alternatives. Thus, the probability that individual n chooses alternative
j remains as expressed in equation 3 and individuals behave with IIA [cf.
Erdem et al., 2008]. 8
The mixed logit can be transformed by expressing the individuals’ tastes in
terms of di erences from the mean tastes in the population. Deﬁning  n  
 n    , the model can be written as
unj = xj  + xj n +  nj
 nj
iid   EV (I) forn =1 ,...N and j =1 ,...,J
 n
iid   MV N (0, ) forn =1 ,...N
(5)
By considering the variation in tastes across individuals in addition to the
variation at the individual level, we can deﬁne a random component of utility
as  nj   xj n +  nj. A correlation between alternatives exists in this random
component of utility, as the covariance between  nj and  nk is




It should clear, however, that this correlation is a property of the population as
opposed to a property of an individual because it is determined by integrating
over the tastes of all individuals in the population. In contrast, the random
component of utility at the individual level,  nj and  nk, remains uncorrelated
between alternatives as stated in equation 2.
8 Some have gone so far as to imply that the mixed logit model breaks IIA at
the individual level. The choice probabilities that they suggest [cf. Train, 2003, p.
142], however, are integrated over the tastes of all individuals in the population and
therefore are not individual choice probabilities.
8It has been conjectured that the population correlations overcome the prob-
lems with IIA, but neither an individual (equation 3) nor the population as
a whole (Proposition 1) behaves rationally in a mixed logit model. This leads
to a number of questions: Even if the population correlations did completely
address the issues with IIA, how do we give economic meaning to this solution
in anything other than a technical sense? Does it matter that the covariation
between alternatives depends only on  , which is a property of the popula-
tion as opposed to the individual? Why does the presence of individuals with
di erent tastes a ect the substitution behavior of any given individual? Does
it matter that the mixed logit model collapses into the multinomial logit if
tastes do not vary across individuals?
The previous work of Robinson [1950] should make us even more cautious
about inferring that population (ecological) correlations can ﬁx a problem
with individual choice behavior. Robinson shows that ﬁnding correlations in
a population does not necessarily imply that correlations exist among indi-
viduals. A parallel can be drawn with the mixed logit in that the correlations
between alternatives exist only in aggregate. Robinson also suggests that the
behavior of a population should not be applied to the behavior of individ-
uals 9 , and we may wonder whether the mixed logit can ﬁt the data well if
individuals do behave rationally.
4 Monte Carlo Choice Experiments
A test for whether the mixed logit model allows for perfect substitution can
be constructed by estimating it across multiple Monte Carlo experiments in
which the alternatives are presented both with and without perfect substi-
tutes. If the choice behavior is captured by the model, then the parameter
estimates will be consistently recovered across the experiments. If not, then
the parameter estimates will systematically vary. We will show that estimat-
ing the mixed logit model on data that contain a perfect substitute results in
biased parameter estimates.
4.1 Population of Individuals with Homogeneous Tastes
To build intuition for how the taste estimates are a ected, ﬁrst consider a
population of hypothetical individuals with homogeneous tastes. Suppose that
these individuals are asked to choose among di erent conﬁgurations of laptop
computers in three separate Monte Carlo experiments. The individuals face
9 Robinson’s critique has come to be known as the ecological fallacy.
9the same series of choices in each experiment, but the presentation of the
alternatives varies across experiments. The laptops have varying weights and
processor speeds, but are identical in all other ways.
In the ﬁrst Monte Carlo experiment, individuals are presented with choices
between two alternatives: one that dominates on weight and another that
dominates on processor speed. The similarity critique does not apply to the
choice behavior in this experiment because any two alternatives are equally
similar to each other; thus, choices can be simulated by assuming that the
individuals behave according to a multinomial logit model.
In the next two Monte Carlo experiments, individuals face the same series of
choices, but three alternatives are presented in each choice set instead of two.
In one experiment, a perfect substitute for the alternative that dominates on
weight is added to the set; in the other, a perfect substitute for the alter-
native that dominates on processor speed is added. Individuals are assumed
to behave rationally. Thus, the choice probability for an alternative with a
perfect substitute is assumed to be exactly 1/2 of what it would have been if
the perfect substitute were not available. For example, suppose an individual
chooses a laptop that weighs 3 lbs and runs at 2.0 GHz with probability 1/2 in
a given choice set. If a perfect substitute for that alternative is added to the
set, the choice probabilities for these two alternatives each would be 1/4 and
the remaining choice probabilities would all stay the same.
Suppose the population consists of 100 individuals whose choices, when only
two alternatives are presented, can be described by a multinomial logit model
with tastes for weight and speed of {-0.3470, 1.041} respectively. These tastes
imply that a 1 lb reduction in a laptop’s weight would produce the same change
in utility as a 1/3 GHz increase in its processor speed for each individual in
the population. For simplicity, nine di erent sets of alternatives were used to
simulate data. These sets along with the corresponding choice probabilities
for each alternative in each of the Monte Carlo experiments are presented in
Table 1.
In order to eliminate concerns about sample size, ninety choices were simulated
for each individual (ten repetitions of the nine choice sets), which resulted
in a total of 9,000 simulated choices. Given the design of the experiment,
roughly half of the observed choices should have been for the alternative that
dominated on weight and half for the alternative that dominated on processor
speed when the data are pooled across all choice sets. This was observed in
the data, as the alternative that dominated on weight was respectively chosen
49.4%, 49.6% and 50.1% of the time across the three Monte Carlo experiments.
A summary of the observed choices is provided in Table 2.
The researcher’s estimation problem is to draw inference about the individ-
10uals’ tastes from their observed choices. To accomplish this, we estimated a
multinomial logit model 10 using the observed choice data in each of the three
Monte Carlo experiments. A summary of the results is presented in Table 3.
Although the data were generated by assuming that individuals behave consis-
tently across choice sets, the parameter estimates vary widely across the three
Monte Carlo experiments. The results are reasonable when individuals are
presented with only two alternatives. The multinomial logit model estimates
that a 1 lb reduction in a laptop’s weight would produce the same change in
utility as a 0.341 GHz increase in its processor speed, which is close to the
true value of 0.333 GHz.
Nevertheless, the model produces undesirable results when individuals face
perfect substitutes: it underestimates the individuals’ tastes for the attribute
on which the perfect substitutes dominate. When estimated on the data set
that contains perfect substitutes for the lightweight alternative, the multino-
mial logit model estimates that a 1 lb reduction in the laptop’s weight pro-
duces the same change in utility as a 0.123 GHz increase in its processor speed.
The model predicts that individuals value lighter weights much less than they
actually do. Conversely, when estimated on a data set that contains perfect
substitutes for the fast-processor alternative, the multinomial logit model es-
timates that a 1 lb reduction in the laptop’s weight produces the same change
in utility as a 1.14 GHz increase in processor speed. The model predicts that
individuals value faster processor speeds much less than they actually do.
What causes these two estimates to di er by nearly an order of magnitude?
The multinomial logit model undervalues the individuals’ tastes for the dom-
inant attribute of the perfect substitutes because utility is constructed as a
scalar index that ignores the similarity of the alternatives in attribute space. A
perfect substitute must draw half of an individual’s choices away from its twin
alternative if an individual is to behave consistently across choice sets. The
model cannot capture this behavior because the similarity of the alternatives
is not accounted for either in the utility function or elsewhere in the model.
Thus, when a perfect substitute for the alternative that dominates on weight
is available, the model attributes the lower frequency of its choice to individu-
als valuing lighter weights less than they actually do rather than to a greater
number of alternatives being available. Likewise, when a perfect substitute
for the alternative that dominates on processor speed is available, the model
attributes its lower frequency of choice to individuals valuing faster processors
less than they actually do rather than to a greater number of alternatives
being available.
10 All models were estimated using bayesm, an open software package available for
the R programming language. See Rossi et al. [2005] for details.
114.2 Population of Individuals with Heterogeneous Tastes
Now consider a population of individuals with heterogeneous tastes that is
subjected to the same experiment. Suppose this population consists of two
types of people, Salespeople and Scientists. The Salespeople’s tastes di er
from the Scientists’, but within each subpopulation the tastes of individual
Salespeople and individual Scientists are the same. The Salespeople’s tastes
for weight and speed respectively are {-0.4618, 0.6927}, which implies that
a 1 lb. reduction in weight produces the same change in utility as a 0.667
GHz increase in processor speed. The Scientists’ tastes for weight and speed
respectively are {-0.2322, 1.3932}, which implies that a 1 lb. reduction in
weight produces the same change in utility as a 0.167 GHz increase in clock
speed. The choice sets along with the corresponding choice probabilities for
both types of individuals are presented in Table 4.
Suppose the population consists of 100 Salespeople and 100 Scientists. Every
individual in the population makes 90 choices, which results in a total of
18,000 observations. Given the design of the experiment, Salespeople should
have chosen the laptop that dominated on weight roughly 61% of the time
whereas Scientists should have chosen it roughly 39% of the time. This was
observed in the data as Salespeople chose the laptop that dominated on weight
61.4%, 62.0% and 61.8% of the time whereas Scientists chose this alternative
37.8%, 39.4% and 39.5% of the time across the three Monte Carlo experiments.
A summary of the observed choices is provided in Table 5.
To infer the individuals’ tastes from their observed choices, we estimated the
following random coe cients logit model:
unjt = xjt n +  njt
 njt
iid   EV (I) for n =1 ,...N, j =1 ,...,J and t =1 ,...,T
 n
iid   N (  zn, ) for n =1 ,...N
(7)
where the demographic variable zn indicates whether an individual is a Sales-
person or a Scientist.
Numerical summaries of the results are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Table
6 contains the parameter estimates and Table 7 contains the implied trade-
o s between weight and processor speed for the average Salesperson and the
average Scientist. Graphical summaries of how tastes are distributed across in-
dividuals within each subpopulation are provided in Figure 1; these box plots
are constructed by using the 100 posterior means of  n within each subpop-
ulation as data. The labels EXP I, EXP II, and EXP III refer to the Monte
Carlo experiments in which individuals respectively faced a choice set contain-
12ing only two alternatives, perfect substitutes for the lightweight alternative,
and perfect substitutes for the fast-processor alternative.
Although the individuals are assumed to behave consistently no matter how
the alternatives are presented in the choice set, the estimates of their tastes
again vary widely across the three Monte Carlo experiments. The results are
reasonable when individuals face only two alternatives. The mixed logit model
estimates that a 1 lb reduction in weight would produce the same change in
utility as a 0.656 GHz increase in processor speed for the average Salesperson
and as a 0.150 GHz increase for the average Scientists, which are close to the
true values. Also, the distributions of individual tastes for both Salespeople
and Scientists surround the true parameter values that were assumed in the
experiment, as can be seen in the box plots for EXP I.
Nevertheless, the mixed logit model produces biased parameter estimates when
individuals face perfect substitutes: it underestimates both the Salespeople’s
and the Scientists’ tastes for the attribute on which the perfect substitutes
dominate. When estimated on the data set that contains a perfect substitute
for the lightweight alternative (EXP II), the mixed logit model estimates that
a 1 lb reduction in the laptop’s weight produces the same change in utility as
a 0.255 GHz increase in processor speed for the average Salesperson and as a
0.0420 GHz increase for the average Scientist. The model predicts that both
Salespeople and Scientists value lighter weights much less than they actually
do. Conversely, when estimated on a data set with a perfect substitutes for the
fast-processor alternative (EXP III), the model estimates that a 1 lb reduction
in the laptop’s weight produces the same change in utility as a 1.64 GHz
increase in processor speed for the average Salesperson and as a 0.502 GHz
increase for the average Scientist. The model predicts that both Salespeople
and Scientists value faster processor speeds much less than they actually do.
It may be thought that the mixed logit model is able to recover the distribution
of tastes in the population even if it fails to recover the tastes of any individual
correctly, but this is not the case either. The mixed logit model undervalues the
tastes of both Salespeople and Scientists for the attribute on which a perfect
substitute dominates, which shifts the distributions of both subpopulations
in the same direction. As can been seen in the box plots, the distributions
of both the Salespeople’s and the Scientists’ tastes for weight shifts toward
zero (meaning that weight is less valued) and for speed shifts away from zero
(meaning that speed is more highly valued) in EXP II. Conversely, the opposite
occurs in EXP III.
These Monte Carlo experiments show that allowing for di erences in tastes
across individuals does not address the similarity critique. The presence of
a perfect substitute biases the parameter estimates in the same direction for
all individuals under study, with the mixed logit model undervaluing both
13the Salespeople’s and the Scientists’ tastes for the dominant attribute of the
perfect substitute.
4.2.1 Policy Analysis
Choice models are commonly used to predict the market shares that would
arise following a new product introduction. Consumers’ tastes are elicited
through choice-based conjoint experiments, various new conﬁgurations of al-
ternatives are proposed, and market shares are simulated using the choice
model. Obviously, this procedure is not useful if the parameter estimates are
biased, but we might wonder if concerns still exist if only two alternatives
are presented in the conjoint experiment. Unfortunately, this is not the case
because the model does not allow the desired substitution patterns to be pre-
dicted when a new alternative is introduced.
Consider the market shares predicted by the mixed logit model in EXP I for
the laptops in the opening example. (These shares are reported in Table 8.)
The model makes accurate predictions in Choice Set I, which contains only
two alternatives, just as the data used to estimate the model did. The model,
however, mispredicts the market shares when a third alternative is introduced.
When a perfect substitute for the lighter alternative is introduced (Choice Set
II), the market share of the lighter laptop rises from 49.6% to 64.0% in the
population. Conversely, when a perfect substitute for the faster alternative is
introduced (Choice Set III), the market share of the faster laptop rises from
50.4% to 64.8% in the population. Similar substitution patterns are found in
the market segments too.
The implication for marketers is clear: the mixed logit model would over-
predict the market share that arises for a me-too product if it is introduced
into the choice set, would under-predict the share stolen from the replicated
incumbent, and would over-predict the share stolen from the distinct incum-
bent.
5 Conclusion
It is undoubtedly important to account for di erences in tastes if we want
to study people’s choices in almost any real world setting, and the modeling
innovations of the past several decades will continue to prove useful in this
regard. Nevertheless, this study deﬁnitively shows that allowing for di erences
in tastes is not adequate to address the similarity critique.
A choice model with IIA implies that individuals behave inconsistently and
14therefore irrationally across choice sets. In prediction, it implies that overall
demand for a given alternative must rise if a perfect substitute for it is added
to the choice set, which paints an overly optimistic picture for me-too product
introductions. In estimation, parameters will be biased if rational behavior is
observed, with the taste of every individual being systematically undervalued.
The heart of the matter is that IIA is an assumption about how an individual
behaves, and concerns about it cannot be addressed by allowing for di erences
across individuals.
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16Table 1
Choice Probabilities for the Population of Individuals with Homogeneous Tastes
Choice Set Alternatives EXP I EXP II EXP III
I 4.5 lbs, 2.0 GHz 0.5 0.25, 0.25 0.5
6.0 lbs, 2.5 GHz 0.5 0.5 0.25, 0.25
II 3.0 lbs., 2.0 GHz 0.627 0.314, 0.314 0.627
6.0 lbs., 2.5 GHz 0.372 0.372 0.186, 0.186
III 4.5 lbs, 2.0 GHz 0.372 0.186, 0.186 0.372
6.0 lbs, 3.0 GHz 0.627 0.627 0.314, 0.314
IV 3.0 lbs, 2.0 GHz 0.5 0.25, 0.25 0.5
6.0 lbs, 3.0 GHz 0.5 0.5 0.25, 0.25
V 4.5 lbs, 2.5 GHz 0.5 0.25, 0.25 0.5
6.0 lbs, 3.0 GHz 0.5 0.5 0.25, 0.25
VI 3.0 lbs, 2.5 GHz 0.627 0.314, 0.314 0.627
6.0 lbs, 3.0 GHz 0.372 0.372 0.186, 0.186
VII 3.0 lbs, 2.0 GHz 0.5 0.25, 0.25 0.5
4.5 lbs, 2.5 GHz 0.5 0.5 0.25, 0.25
VIII 3.0 lbs, 2.0 GHz 0.372 0.186, 0.186 0.372
4.5 lbs, 3.0 GHz 0.627 0.627 0.314, 0.314
IX 3.0 lbs, 2.5 GHz 0.5 0.25, 0.25 0.5
4.5 lbs, 3.0 GHz 0.5 0.5 0.25, 0.25
17Table 2
Observed Choices for the Population of Individuals with Homogeneous Tastes
Choice Set Alternatives EXP I EXP II EXP III
I 4.5 lbs., 2.0 GHz 491 245, 250 484
6.0 lbs, 2.5 GHz 509 505 231, 285
II 3.0 lbs., 2.0 GHz 604 314, 291 639
6.0 lbs., 2.5 GHz 396 395 178, 183
III 4.5 lbs, 2.0 GHz 377 173, 178 403
6.0 lbs, 3.0 GHz 623 649 288, 309
IV 3.0 lbs, 2.0 GHz 506 249, 260 497
6.0 lbs, 3.0 GHz 494 491 262, 241
V 4.5 lbs, 2.5 GHz 516 245, 251 518
6.0 lbs, 3.0 GHz 484 504 234, 248
VI 3.0 lbs, 2.5 GHz 648 289, 341 613
6.0 lbs, 3.0 GHz 352 370 191, 196
VII 4.5 lbs, 2.5 GHz 483 484 251, 235
3.0 lbs, 2.0 GHz 517 230, 286 514
VIII 3.0 lbs, 2.0 GHz 365 168, 192 396
4.5 lbs, 3.0 GHz 635 640 289, 315
IX 3.0 lbs, 2.5 GHz 526 253, 272 473
4.5 lbs, 3.0 GHz 474 475 262, 265
Totals Lighter Weight 4450 2166, 2321 4537
Faster Processor 4550 4513 2186, 2277
18Table 3
Parameter Estimates for the Population with Homogeneous Tastes
Truth EXP I EXP II EXP III
Weight -0.347 -0.351 -0.194 -0.476
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Speed 1.041 1.027 1.578 0.418
(0.066) (0.065) (0.064)
1 lb weight
reduction = 0.333 GHz 0.342 GHz 0.123 GHz 1.14 GHz
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